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The Photographic Insane 
Kathryn Fraser 
RÉSUMÉ 
Le célèbre essai de Bazin concernant l'identification de 
la photographie en fonction de son sujet relevait des 
liens des premières photographies avec les expérimenta-
tions des sciences humaines (la psychiatr ie) . 
Contrairement à cette tendance Pauteure développe, 
dans ce texte, le point de vue selon lequel la perception 
est reliée à un processus conceptuel. Cet article con-
stitue une courte examination de ce que Pauteure 
appelle the photographie insane et illustre comment les 
images de la folie utilisent et demandent pour leur 
interprétation une construction «schématique» parti-
culière et partagée culturellement. 
ABSTRACT 
Bazins famous essay touting the photograph's identical-
l y with its subject was precedented by photography's 
early relation to empirical investigation in the human 
sciences (the psychiatry). Contrary to this, what this 
author wishes to reinforce in this paper is that percep-
tion is constructed and integrally bound up with con-
ceptual processes. This paper thus constitutes a short 
examination of what this author calls the " Photo-
graphic Insane, " and illustrates how images of madness 
use, and require for their interpretation, a particular, 
and culturally shared " schematic " framework. 
Images of madness are by now familiar to us. We have all 
encountered, at one time or another, someone whose gestures or 
facial expressions are recognizable to us as insane. Whether 
through our personal experience of the crowded urban land-
scape in which we live and work, or through images rendered in 
The Photographic Insane 139 
literature, painting, photography, and cinema, the features of 
madness seem imminently accessible. T h e move from artistic 
representat ions of madness to the science of phys iognomy 
employed in the service of medical illustration constitutes a sig-
nificant shift in both established modes of perception as well as 
in the motivation behind the production of such images. The 
introduction of photography to the clinical gaze,1 which might 
be seen to have instigated a return to eighteenth-century posi-
tivism, first occurred in the field of psychiatry — a discipline 
no t usually considered in terms of its empirical potent ia l . 
Photography's early — and we might say somewhat sustained 
— status as an objective medium has imbued it with a particu-
lar authority when representing to us the human form in all of 
its manifestations. There is, in the tradition of medical imaging 
and in early photographic studies used to set up indices of nor-
malcy and deviance (I am thinking here of the movement stud-
ies executed by Jules Marey and others), the assumption that 
perception is ahistorical, disinterested, and objective. Contrary 
to this, what I wish to reinforce here is that perception is con-
structed and integrally bound up with conceptual processes. 
This is not to deny the veracity of our " direct " visual (or aural2) 
experience of mental illness. Rather, it is necessary to acknowl-
edge the ways in which " ideas " about madness have historically 
shaped, and cont inue to inform, its representations and the 
technologies used to do so. 
My interest in what I have called the " Photographic Insane " 
was first inspired by the " before " and " after " pictures of 
Christine and Léa Papin, two domestics who, in the town of Le 
Mans, France, in 1933, brutally murdered their employer and 
her daughter. The images are intended to represent the sisters at 
a time first, of mental stability, and then, of extreme psychic 
trauma. The interval between the two images is therefore sup-
posed to designate a transformation from apparent normalcy to 
visually perceptible deviance. In fact, one of the original purpos-
es of psychiatric photography was to ease a growing public anxi-
ety with respect to the increasing dangers associated with an 
ever-expanding social arena. Psychiatric (as well as criminal) 
photography and physiognomy promised to educate a nervous 
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public about who they could and could not trust on the urban 
scene. The problem with such an aim, as we have seen with 
" actual " psychotics such as Jeffrey Dahmer or Paul Bernardo, is 
t ha t they succeed in the i r c r imes precisely because they 
" a p p e a r " to be " n o di f ferent" from us. T h u s how do we 
account for the normalcy of the first image which made the vio-
lence preceding the second image possible ? In other words, if 
mental illness Is so readily available to the " naked eye " of the 
camera, why wasn't it available to the Papins victims — M m e 
and Mile Lancelin — who might then have been able to save 
their own lives ? 
I submit that what the Papin photographs (as well as many 
other photographic instances of insanity) represent is not mad-
ness, but the photographic code, or "schema" of madness. The 
concept of " schema " proposed by Ernst Gombrich explains 
both how we are able to recognize shapes / faces / etc., as famil-
iar, as well as how visual representation can consist of as com-
plex a system of codes as verbal language. Schemata regulate 
perception and allow us to impose the familiar on the less famil-
iar through the incorporation of generalized or pre-existing cate-
gories. " T h e schema is not the product of a process of 'abs t rac-
t ion , ' or a t endency to ' simplify ; ' it represents the first 
approximate, loose category which is gradually tightened to fit 
the form it is to reproduce. " (1960, p. 74) 
Schemata thus also function to create " types, " the recogni-
tion of which depends on a viewing subjects understanding of 
visual difference : " For it is not really the perception of likeness 
for which we have been programmed, but the ' not ic ing of 
unlikeness \ " (p. 13) Recognition is therefore relative: it is 
informed by past experience, and by our expectation that an 
external image will always be different from oneself. In fact, 
Gombrich goes so far as to say that we may actually " produce " 
visual characteristics in an image as a result of our need to make 
sense of, or to distinguish ourselves from, it : " We tend to pro-
ject life and expression onto the arrested image and supplement 
from our own experience what is not actually present. " (p. 17) 
The reliability of an image, then, is based more on how well it 
corresponds to our belief system than on how neatly it conforms 
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to the " actual " physical dimensions of the object it represents. 
For example, prior to the eighteenth century, representation 
tended toward depictions of medical procedure such as remov-
ing the " s tone of madness. " N o t yet conceptualized as an 
" invisible " disease, insanity was imagined as being located in a 
stone which necessitated removal if the patient was to be cured. 
This fictive symptom " [was] a means of representing an invisi-
ble state." (Gilman, 1988, p. 19) It also, however, served the 
function of alleviating anxiety about mental illness : if it could 
be solved by a " simple " operation (that is, if one lived through 
it), then it wouldn't represent as great a threat to the social 
order. 
Perhaps most importantly, as Sander Gilman has shown, for 
all representations of madness whatever the historical frame-
work, is the t endency to represent the insane as " other. " 
Alterity has always functioned as a source of anxiety, and the 
fears of a society are usually projected onto whoever the " other " 
happens to be at any given moment. One of the images of mad-
ness in the Middle Ages, for example, delineated the terrain of 
insanity as animal and wild. Madness was conceptualized as bes-
tial with the sufferer in a perpetually feral state. Later, during 
the Renaissance, the mad were displayed in cages set up in the 
streets, or were visible through the bars on the windows of their 
cells in the as yet unreformed asylums. In fact, up until the early 
n i n e t e e n t h century, Foucaul t tells us, some asylums even 
charged admission to behold the spectacle of the insane. Like 
animals on display in a zoo, the mentally ill were furnished with 
only a bit of straw, and were usually only barely — if at all — 
clothed. The idea was that, like animals, the mad were indiffer-
ent to their surroundings ; to such things as fluctuations in tem-
perature, or the stench or their own refuse. Unable to conceive 
of man without rational thought (indeed, without thought at 
all), the Enlightenment could only understand madness as bes-
tial : " [...] madness in its ultimate form is man in immediate 
relation to his animality, wi thou t o ther reference, w i thou t 
recourse." (Foucault, 1965, p. 74) Further, since the mad were 
considered to reside in a perpetually feral state, literary and 
artistic representations showed the madman with long, claw-like 
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nails, and he was hirsute. It is equally important to note the 
equation of darkness with madness and to remember that the 
experience of racial alterity was tightly bound up with a strong 
eurocentrism : cultural / religious deviation was equated with 
savagery, barbarousness. Mediterraneans, blacks — anyone with 
darker skin than the central European — were thus conceptual-
ized in animal terms. 
Still, as a consequence of the new emphasis on scientism ini-
tiated in the eighteenth century, the view of madness as animali-
ty gradually came to be replaced by the view of madness as dis-
ease. Since the tenets of the Enlightenment stated that reason 
was " the " natural, ontological condi t ion of " man, " it was 
believed that the insane could be restored to sanity through 
rigourous observation. To quote Michel Foucault: "We know 
the images. They are familiar in all histories of psychiatry, where 
their function is to illustrate that happy age when madness was 
finally recognized and treated according to a truth to which we 
had long remained blind." (1965, p. 141) Of course, Foucault 
is referring to the changes in the asylum in the nineteenth cen-
tury which closed its doors on the public and put a stop to the 
" commodification " of the mentally ill. Preceding these reforms, 
however, were a number of innovations which paved the way for 
madness to be understood not as wholly other, but as a devia-
tion from the normal. Instrumental to this notion was the redis-
covery of classical physiognomy by Johann Caspar Lavater in 
the 1770s. In its application to mental illness in the eighteenth 
century, physiognomy " [...] captured the popular fancy of all 
Europe" (Gilman, 1988. p. 25) since it promised to reconcile 
the previous opposit ion postulated between mind and body 
now increasingly under scrutiny. The unique workings of the 
mind, it was believed, could be ascertained through physical fea-
tures. 
In keeping with eighteenth-century notions of individuality, 
representation took a swift turn in the direction of portraiture 
and henceforward madness seems to have become individual-
ized. Images now functioned as maps with the anatomies of 
idiocy and madness clearly demarcated by various and conspicu-
ous physiological features. Further, the patient needed only to 
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recognize himself in the image of insanity and to note his differ-
ence from images of " normalcy " in order to restore himself to 
reason and sanity. The use of codes of portraiture (e.g. image 
limited to representing the head and shoulders on a plain or 
non-existent background) and the choice to represent a posed 
subject rather than an arrested moment in time (such as a surgi-
cal procedure) all contributed to the increasing medicalization 
of such images. It also, however, had the effect of creating a 
visual model rather than representing a psychological state. This 
model would become very important in the nineteenth centu-
ry's discovery of the archival potential of the " photographic 
insane. " The move from representing mental illness in aesthetic 
terms (as in images of surgery or bestiality) to representing it as 
a disease suffered by a living person (as in medical illustration or 
physiognomy) aided a practical purpose to be realized in the 
nineteenth century: that of recognition through the construc-
tion of visual " types. " 
T h e nineteenth century inaugurated a period of intensive 
urbanization. To meet the ever-increasing need to populate the 
factories, the cities expanded rapidly bringing together (at least 
spatially) people from previously unassimilable groups. Judith 
Walkowitz, in her study of " late-Victorian London, " also notes 
the erosion of the physical boundaries separating class from class 
(urban from rural, etc.) as having been facilitated, in part, by 
technologies devoted to a viewing subject (I am thinking here of 
innovat ions in archi tec ture and, of course, pho tog raphy) . 
Various marginalized groups, she tells us, " [...] spilled over and 
out of their ascribed, bounded roles, costumes and locales into 
the public streets" (p. 41), which not only obscured the previ-
ous distinction between classes, but also rendered the streets 
increasingly dangerous. Alan Sekula has suggested that, as a con-
sequence, it became even more urgent to distinguish self from 
" other ; " to be able to visually identify amongst the crowd of 
faces (the most available physical marker of difference in a 
crowd) who could be trusted and who might pose a threat. The 
new photographic medium, he argues, was perfectly suited to 
such an endeavour, [...] photography came to establish and 
delimit the terrain of the * other, ' to define both the ' general-
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ized look ' — the typology — and the 'contingent instance ' of 
deviance and social pathology. " (p. 7) 
Used in tandem with the codes of portraiture established in 
the eighteenth century, the physiognomic method was particu-
larly advantageous to " scientific " photography since it focused 
on the face of the deviant, rather than on his / her trappings. 
The traditional function of the portrait — " [...] the ceremonial 
presentation of the bourgeois ' self " (p. 6) — becomes degrad-
ed here : it delineates the " other, " paradoxically, through a 
schema of " shared " difference. This schema relied in turn on 
the art historical tradition of representing insanity as bestial and 
potentially violent. Of course, the identification of insanity with 
aggressivity is not necessarily new. Rather, it is the ways in 
which photography was able (with the help of physiognomic 
and phrenological methods of identification) to construct a 
readily available visual blueprint from which to abstract mental 
and social aberrance. Indeed, even though photography's early 
pioneers' interests were not so much aesthetic as indexical, they 
d e p e n d e d for thei r coherence on an establ ished aes thet ic 
schema. The result — which is very much our legacy — has 
been to collapse social deviance and mental illness into one sin-
ister visual typology. The criminal photographic archive thus 
gave birth to psychiatric photography, and to the idea that mad-
ness and criminality were complimentarily charted on a person's 
physiology. 
If the visual typology of the insane is wild, the pathology is 
located not only in the mad-person's skull shape and size (as 
with eighteenth-century phrenology), but in her / his " look . " 3 
The emphasis on " seeing " and violence cannot be overstated 
here since it is in the eyes that most representations tend to 
locate madness and aggression (one need only look at the après 
Papin photograph to see that this is so). In fact, it is often the 
fear of being " seen " by the madperson — being " noticed " by 
her / him — that induces much of the " normal " population's 
anxiety. The insane see differently, and they often see what isn't 
there (as with hallucinations4). In this visual dialectic of seeing 
and being seen, there is a sense of personal vulnerability we 
associate with the threat of violence, or loss of control .5 The 
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mad person, we thus convince ourselves, is as identifiable by her 
/ his comportment as (s)he is by her/his physical appearance. 
We can identify them and thus protect ourselves from them. 
The visual signs of the mad are then reassuring. They allow us 
to feel that we have some control over our environment, over 
the chaos we fear surrounds us. However, the reality is often 
quite different from the composite we have assembled from 
myth ; from artistic representations ; and from our everyday 
experience of the insane as recognizable in the stereotype of the 
bag lady/man (who is rarely, if ever, the perpetrator of violent 
crime). 
Let us return now to the Papin photographs : the avant image 
of the Papins might thus be seen to constitute even more of a 
threat as a consequence of its codic or schematic normalcy. This 
image represents most clearly the traditional function of portrai-
ture. It represents the two — despite their similar dress and coif-
fures — as discrete — that is, controlled — " selves. " In the 
après image, on the other hand , it is difficult to determine 
which sister is which. They are no longer two sisters posing for a 
portrait, but one criminal type: unkept, unfocused, menacing. 
In the " before " image the horror is " that they are just like us ; " 
that they do not signal to us their difference. The " after " pho-
tograph is therefore reassuring. It conforms to our idea of what 
madness looks like. But we must remember that the murders — 
which took place before the women's incarceration and thus 
before the " after " image — were a shock to the communi ty 
who knew the Papins as diligent workers and nice girls, and, 
likely, to the Lancelins who employed them. The sisters were 
considered hardworking, pleasant, church-going members of 
society — all of the markers of so-called normalcy. As Gilman 
points out with respect to the perpetrators of much violent 
crime, " Our shock is that they are really just like us. " (1988, p. 
13) This was not, then, a random act of violence enacted on 
strangers " b y " strangers. The Lancelins knew their attackers; 
regarded them as normal (normal enough to have them live and 
work in their home) ; and confronted the sisters fearlessly. There 
was likely no visual apparatus in place to mark Christine and 
Lea as dangerous, otherwise the murders might not have taken 
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place. Therefore, how do we explain the obvious visual patholo-
gy of the " after " photo ? 
As Gombrich has shown, pictures never transparently repre-
sent their subject. What they " do " represent is a schema of the 
cultural conception of a subject. Now, the photographic tech-
nique is especially well-suited to the operations of schemata. As 
an allegedly objective medium, photography promises to imbue 
our conceptual schemata with greater epistemological authority : 
it captures, after all, an actual moment in time. The problem 
with the Papin photographs (as with any photograph) is that we 
can never know all the circumstances surrounding the moment 
at which each photograph was taken and which inevitably con-
t r ibute to the const ruct ion of each image. We can " hypo-
thesize " as to why the sisters' appearance is so altered based on 
our understanding of the different conditions under which each 
photograph was taken : the " before " image was taken at the sis-
ters' request ; they had clearly prepared their attire carefully for 
the event, and they probably had an amiable exchange with the 
photographer (for whose services they would be paying). The 
" after " image, on the other hand, was taken after their incarcer-
ation. We can assume they were posed under duress and that 
there was little genial interaction between them and the photog-
rapher. Moreover, the purpose of the second photograph is quite 
clear : to show how murderous insanity has imprinted itself on 
the faces of the women . Even though it is, like most p h o -
tographs of its kind, reliant on aesthetic codes, the image is not 
so much aesthetic as it is illustrative. The sisters are not willing 
subjects here. They do not look at the camera (perhaps they 
were even told not to), and unlike the first image, we can read 
no enjoyment of the moment in their postures. 
The captions attached to the images also influence and direct 
our interpretation. If an image is devoid of any verbal commen-
tary, or if it is unrelated syntagmatically to another image, it is 
more likely to be subject to interpretation. The avant and après 
titles then indicate an almost narrative t ransformation and 
inform the viewer as to how each image should be read. But 
viewing the two portraits separately, we would be unlikely to 
make the connection between the two women and their trans-
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formed counterparts without being told that the women depict-
ed in each photo are the same. The after image depends for its 
coherence not only on established codes of deviance, but also on 
its relationship to the before image. In fact, it is easy to see how 
the after image has been manipulated to have the most effect on 
a viewer unfamiliar with the case. The sisters appear in the after 
photograph much as they appear in the before. In both images 
the sisters are dressed alike ; Léa appears on the left and 
Christine on the right, and the backgrounds are contrived to 
highlight the faces of the women. Clearly, the sequential order-
ing of the images, and their similar composition, is designed to 
reinforce the effect of the " after " photograph ; to reassure us 
that our schematic framework is correct. But, as Christopher 
Lane says: " [...] chronology is deceptive here, for the p h o -
tographs could easily be reversed with the distress of the ' after ' 
incorporated into the apparent calm of the ' be fo re ' . " (p. 24) 
Indeed. The " before image, " we must remember, preceded the 
murders; it schematically conformed to the way in which the 
sisters "actually" looked. Their insanity, then, was not readily 
identifiable from their appearances ; it only " becomes " readable 
once their deviance has already been established. 
To conclude, this has not been an exhaustive foray into the 
photographic insane, as there are many other aspects of its pro-
duction that have still to be considered. A larger project, for 
example, might expand its parameters to include a discussion of 
the ways in which instances of insanity are constructed in rela-
tion to the familiar triad of gender, class and racial identity. It is 
also significant to note that most recently — on the heels of 
much feminist achievement — films depicting female violence 
and insanity have captured the popular imagination. Beginning 
with Fatal Attraction, there have been a number of " psychotic 
women " movies which have culminated in what I believe to be 
the ul t imate lethal woman film, Basic Instinct. T h o u g h the 
women's madness " i s " visible in these films and is encoded in 
terms of what con tempora ry Amer ican cul ture finds most 
threatening — the single, successful and sexually excessive 
woman — the purpose of filmic representations differs qualita-
tively from that of psychiatric representations. The important 
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similarity, however, is in the fact that psychiatric photography 
and Hollywood cinema have each focused their attention on the 
woman who resides outside of the domain of masculine authori-
ty. This particular stereotype of the madwoman is well-known, 
as is the stereotype of the dangerous, racial other. These are 
components of psychiatric photography's history that have only 
been hinted at in this paper, but which are fodder for a more 
extensive and thorough undertaking. My intent here has been to 
stress the possible implications of visualizing madness, and, in 
light of Hollywood cinema's long preoccupation with mental ill-
ness, to provide a prolegomena toward an area of film research 
to be pursued more comprehensively in the future. 
McGiIl University 
NOTES 
1 Michel Foucault, in The Birth of the Clinic : An Archaeology of Medical 
Perception (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) talks about the clinical gaze as one 
which " [...] refrains from all possible intervention, and from all experimental deci-
sion. " (p. 108) The Foucauldian gaze, which is, in this instance, pre-Modern, is 
entirely objective. This is not to say that it resides outside the structures of perception 
of a viewing "subject" Instead, the gaze as Foucault describes it here is that of the 
observer who sees but does not intrude upon, and has no control over, what (s)he 
sees. 
2 Such as lapses in discourse or garbled speech. 
3 I use the word "look" here in the sense that Herbert Spiegelberg has used it in 
his essay " T h e Phenomenology of the Look" {Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology, vol. 20, n" 2, 1989). It is to be distinguished from perception and 
sight, and is also not to be wholly confused with appearance. It is a mode of " regard-
ing " the world that — in the way I have used it — seems peculiar to the mad person. 
We might say the " look " can be ascertained in the eyes of the mad person, but it may 
also be the way in which the mad person " sees. " 
4 An excellent example of the " seeing insane " is to be found in contemporary 
Hollywood cinema. The psychotic characters in Seven (1995) and Copycat (1995), for 
example, force the characters (and the audience) to see their insanity by turning " mur-
der into art" (or so goes the song in Copycat). In Copycat, the character reenacts 
famous historical murders modeled on photographs detailed in books on serial killers. 
The murderer in Seven represents a series of internal states through a succession of 
colour-coded, grisly, but artistic, tableaux. They are not themselves, then, visually iden-
tifiable by others as insane (which is what makes them so dangerous). Rather, it is the 
way in which they see (and force us to see) that brands them as mad (and criminal). 
5 The seeing-and-being-seen dynamic is especially symbolic with respect to the 
Papin crime : the sisters' most heinous (and remarkable) feat was removing their vic-
tims' eyes with the optic nerves intact. Jacques Lacan (and others since) argued that 
such an act was inextricably linked to the sisters' paranoid experience of feeling sur-
150 Cinémas, vol. 9, n° 1 
veyed. Enucleation, in this instance, removed the objectifying, disciplining gaze of the 
Other. 
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